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Impact of documentary requirements of state 
subsidy grants on moral hazard
Vas György1
Lowering moral hazard is possible by proper incentives, therefore we examine the elements 
of the documentary request of the contract and the application of the state aid process. 
We conclude that the aim using administrative constraints is rather detecting fraud than 
fighting moral hazard issues. If the documentary requirement would aim treating moral 
hazard, it would shrink the number of companies eligible for tendering. Due to the second 
effect of documentary requirements lowering moral hazard is only possible if adequate 
quality measurers can be defined in form of an incentive for the tendering process and are 
rigorously controlled in the standstill phase of the development projects.
1 Introduction
State aid programs for micro, small- and medium sized companies contribute making unit 
cost of production lower in order to stimulate economic growth. However, firms are not trans-
ferring back funds in exchange as they do for loan-repayment but generate social surplus by exe-
cuting projects2 in line with the development policy. Following (Varian 2014) consumer and pro-
ducer surplus combined equals social surplus theoretically. For further consideration practically 
profit of companies alone can be used as right indicator, for two reasons. Once, SME’s increase 
local supply, meaning that firms can launch products and services due to the positive effect of 
state aid grants in certain areas where availability was maleficent, if it is profitable. Second, any 
price decrease for increase in consumer surplus can have positive impact on social surplus only 
if firms don’t suffer from losing profitability.
In case of commercial bank financing moral hazard can be defined as a hidden action, where 
the bank is not aware of the expected effort level of the firm, effecting the probability of success of 
the project. Using a unified model (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997) analyzed the common situation 
where firms and banks are also equipped with a constrained amount of capital, therefore both 
require outside sources to fund development projects. Firms’ savings are insufficient to fully back 
the planned investment, while banks struggle to ensure enough credit facilities required by compa-
nies. This is described as credit constraint, a non-equilibrium situation, where changing incentives 
will also not help reaching equilibrium. Increasing interest rates will not improve lending, because 
the market does not believe in, that enterprises would start profitable projects or even if they are in 
position to launch such developments the funds requested for it would be used for cross financing 
purposes. In order to deal with the efficiency of non-refundable subsidies we should enhance the 
1  Budapest Corvinus University, SME research center, research associate
2 We refer to project or development project in a broad since meaning that any investment, restructuring or 
change in production, marketing, sales or general management is considered
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original model with central government, which is responsible for it. Recently (Berlinger E. J., 2015) 
(Berlinger, Lovas, & Juhász, 2016)  considered moral hazard issues of subsidies.
Several elements of the documentary details have the similar effect as the collateral require-
ments of bank financing. If a firm is defaulting, the bank is entitled to use the collateral for repay-
ment. In case of commercial bank financing it is expected that the firm is generating enough cash 
to pay the installments, however in case of state-aid grants the authorities demand positive chan-
ge in social surplus instead of loan repayment. In case of state aid grants there is no repayment, 
but firms have to contribute to economic development policies by increasing social surplus. 
State intervention is regarded in different ways in the economic literature. The role of the sta-
te in corporate lending (J. Tirole 2009) sees in bail-out, based on the original (Holmstrom-Tirole 
1996) model, which is a framework for examining the commercial bank lending and following 
(Berlinger, et.al 2016) it is considered also for state aid grants.
Empirical research was linked to car-insurance industry, by statistically measuring the effect 
of introducing incentives, like the bonus reward systems, in which case (Dionne 2005) (Richau-
deau 1999)  proved a significant drop of moral hazard. The price reduction given for accident 
free driving has a positive effect, i.e. there is no need to control the behavior if it can be found 
an incentive forcing the players to co-operate. (Cardon és Hendel 2001) (Abbring, Chiappori és 
Pinquet 2003) analyzed on large data sets the positive effect of any change in submitted claims of 
newly introduced incentives. The empirical analysis of moral hazard in insurance policies might 
be relevant to state-aid grants, if there can be found relevant incentives which might handle the 
unwanted outcomes of subsidies, rather than controlling behavior of firms. The same outcome 
might be achieved in fighting against subsidized development project without real social surp-
lus by introducing powerful incentives rather than intending to pose administrative control on 
firms’ spending. There is obviously further research needed in this matter. 
By examining policy details of the business development details after the 2008 crisis (Vives 
2010) considers the utilization of state aid grants. It is highlighted that the financial intermediary 
system has dramatically changed as commercial banks have sold part of their portfolio and reor-
ganized its internal policies in order to decrease moral hazard. State intervention was regarded 
as regulatory policy, as trade-off between stability and competition.
(A. N. Berger 2006) proposed a general framework for studying the SME’s access to credits, 
as relevant question both in economic theory and highly important for development policy ma-
ker. (L. Kállay 2014) examines the spill over effect of state aid subsidies, in case of increase in 
employment vs. investment, and better profit generation vs. competitiveness by proposing to 
monitor certain elements of the development policy even if the grants availability is in excess. 
We conclude that there are several similarities in commercial bank financing and state-aid subsi-
dies, and therefore a similar comprehensive framework would be helpful for understanding real 
effects, however there is no such available, due to two basic reasons: once, the form and structure 
of state intervention varies even across member states of the European Union, second, the vast 
variety of the available products and its combinations. (Berger-Udell 2006) contributes with a 
coherence in SME financing, by linking the role of the bank ecosystem with state intervention 
policies to demonstrate how firms can access to credit.
In the framework of commercial bank lending  (A. N. Berger 2006) summarizes the elements 
of items to be considered: methodology of credit policy, the source of information for submission, 
structure of the credit contract and the relationship management. There is a mixture of information 
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derived from financial statements and quality information received from other sources. The same 
breakdown would be helpful for investigating state aid policies; therefore, we examine the docu-
mentary requirements in order to utilize the similarity of commercial bank lending experience.
2 Framework of the tendering process and the contracting 
phase 
The European Commission has the authority to control state aid subsidies in the European Uni-
on, and the emphasis is more on formality rather than examining the real effect on social surplus. 
Since there are several segments receiving grants: innovation driven sectors, economically under-
developed regions, start-ups, and more generally small and medium sized companies, the proper 
utilization of state funds is highly important from economic development policy’s point of view. The 
most relevant international empirical study concerning this was  (Banerjee 2004), by investigating 
the anonymized data of different commercial banks. He concluded that return on investment mea-
sures the effects of commercial bank financing in both developed and underdeveloped markets.
The European Union regulates the forms of state interventions and the types of subsidies. For 
achieving the positive effect, i.e. increase social surplus approx. one percent of GDP was used for 
state aid grants totaling to EUR 100 billion (EuropeanComission 2018).  The types of state aid 
grants show high variety, therefore cannot be defined such as typical subsidy-product, however it 
is expected that whey will be used for assisting non-equilibrium market segments, e.g. the micro, 
small- and medium size enterprises, since SME’s face credit constraint and are not able to raise 
as much credit as they could utilize. 
The 7-year planning period of 2007-2013 made some new products available, such as sub-
sidized loan, grants, guarantee programs and venture capital financing as well, however before 
the 2014-2020 period new financing methods became available. Independently from the EU the 
National Bank of Hungary targeted the SME’s by making widely available discounted credits in 
the framework of the Increase Development by Loans3 (NHP) program. 
The real expenses associated with state-aid grants are awarded in different ways by beneficiaries. 
First, the methodology to determine net present value of the different types of grants is not unique, 
and secondly the perception of temporarily distributed cash-in and outflows might also vary. Consi-
der now the several possibilities that companies can choose from if financing needs are present:
1. Credit line with a commercial bank
2. Discounted loan program by a development bank 
3. Venture Capital financing
4. Capital market financing
5. State aid subsidy
The firm has exact knowledge about the profitability of its projects, by at least knowing the 
possible highest income and profit from the project. There is however a chance that there will 
be no social surplus after completion, i.e. no increase in profitability or in revenues. This is the 
3 We refer here to the Növekedési Hitelprogram (NHP) of National Bank of Hungary
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moral hazard of the state aid financing. It widens the question even more, if we consider that only 
the free money received from the state makes the project feasible, and without this financing it 
from commercial banking sources would have not been possible.
It is therefore highly important to set the precised goal of the investigation, whether we exa-
mine the successful operation of the development policy, or the intermediary system, or the 
development projects themselves. Furthermore, we aim to analyze the intermediary system res-
ponsible for absorbing the state aid grants to SME’s, if we consider that administrative measurers 
might have negligible effect on the success of the development projects. There is unfortunately 
no internationally accepted methodology to detect the effects on economic development policy 
details derived from the state aid subsidized companies.
The EU supports delivering direct, non-refundable state aid grants to the micro, small- and 
medium sized companies, throughout a transparent and competition neutral intermediary sys-
tem. (L. Kállay 2014) concludes that the aim of the Hungarian Development policy is to increase 
the competitiveness of the SME sector, by addressing credit constraint issues. There are several 
types of state aid grants available for Hungarian companies: the non-refundable grants, aiming 
to increase employment, investments and innovation, the tax and social contribution type of 
benefits, guarantee programs, venture capital financing and discounted loan programs. The si-
milarity of the different programs lies in the decrease of unit costs of production. Therefore, 
we conclude that the successive operation of the intermediary system can be derived from the 
increase in profitability of the companies, which we interpret as social surplus. 
The grants are transferred to the SME’s after a formal decision, completion of the contracting 
phase and finally after execution of the development project. Monitoring of the project boils 
down to, checking the fulfillment of the administrative requirements, intending to secure that 
the non-refundable grants will not be used for any case related to fraudulent behavior, rather to 
contribute the boost social surplus. 
The communicated goal of the Operational Program of Economic Development4 being part 
of the New Hungarian Development Plan as master document approved by the European Com-
mittee is economic development, strengthening the knowledge-based economy, supporting 
underdeveloped region, promoting to discover new export markets, and finally supporting the 
permanent economic growth.
For achieving economic development goals there are certain specific objectives defined, cal-
led priorities:
(i) Research and development, innovation capacity and cooperation 
(ii) Increasing complex capacity of corporates 
(iii) Developing business infrastructure
(iv) Access of SME’s to required financing sources 
Certain technical details might influence the tendering process, such as set up and operation 
of the Monitoring, the Governing, and the Paying Authority. Their complex aim indeed is to find 
4 In Hungary as GOP (2007-2013) and GINOP (2014-2020)
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the balance of achieving development goals of Operational Programs and utilize the possible 
maximum funds available by uncovering fraudulent activity. This activity requires control and 
management on quantitative criteria, if powerful qualitative elements would be involved it could 
make the transparent process doubtful. 
The state aid subsidy grants of the European Union differentiate across public and private 
companies, government institutes and other organizations. The combination of the requested 
goal, the source, i.e. which European development fund is effected, and the form of subsidy will 
define the finally available maximum of the operational programs. Considering the statistics 
of the European Union, however, we conclude that the share of micro, small- and medium size 
enterprises was less than ten percent of the regional development programs and remained below 
three percent considering the sum of all the domestic subsidies. The huge number of companies 
receiving fund would require modification in the tendering, contracting and monitoring phase, 
but the execution is done by the same government agency. 
Years / Goal of 
Subsidies 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Regional 
development 342,0 284,7 241,6 273,1 319,7 839,5 426,7 760,4
SME’s directly 29,2 13,8 16,0 6,7 10,5 139,6 120,6 29,7
Total domestic 
subsidies 1339,7 2067,4 1204,1 1193,8 1495,2 1685,6 1443,7 2391,6
Source: EUROSTAT, Values in EUR millions
SME’s might receive European Union’s co-financed state-aid grants, development bank lo-
ans or financial guarantees. Economic growth is generated by firms with and without subsidies. 
We should consider the effect of firms benefiting from the discretionary policy, in relation to 
firms, which are not. There is no clear theoretical methodology of measuring social surplus. We 
define social surplus based on (Varian 2014) as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. It 
is not possible to measure it for the tens of thousand companies; therefore, we concentrate on 
the future effect of investment decisions on social surplus. Economic growth might be expected 
from increase in profit level of the SME’s; therefore, we examine the potential positive effects of 
receiving grants.
The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became bigger, the project generated 
larger profit and contributed to increase in social surplus, with
1. larger own contribution and larger bank financing,
2. larger own contribution but smaller bank financing,
3. smaller own contribution but larger bank financing,
The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became bigger, but the project generated 
smaller profit and contributed to a lesser increase in social surplus, with
4. larger own contribution and larger bank financing,
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5. larger own contribution but smaller bank financing,
6. smaller own contribution but larger bank financing,
The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became smaller, but the project generated 
bigger profit and contributed to a higher increase in social surplus, with
7. smaller own contribution and smaller bank financing,
8. smaller own contribution 
9. smaller bank financing
The investment as a consequence of state-aid grant became smaller, but the project generated 
smaller profit and contributed to a lesser increase in social surplus, with
10. smaller own contribution and smaller bank financing,
11. smaller own contribution 
12. smaller bank financing
After listing all possible outcomes, we examine the effect of the individual cases on economic 
growth. In the first group we have selected the most desirable cases from economic development 
policy perspectives. Social surplus increases with larger project size, leading to higher invest-
ment. This would potentially increase employment, bank lending and generate larger profit by 
SME’s. This is in line with the main goal of economic policy, as (BANAI 2017) pointed out. 
3 The governing role of documentary requirements 
We can talk about moral hazard in case of the 3 plus 3 elements belonging to the second and 
fourth group, whereby due to the state-aid a different project size was selected, with lesser profit 
generation, i.e. we conclude that the social surplus became also smaller. Moral hazard lies in 
the modified social surplus of the development project, compared to the original intent of the 
firm implementing it without state-aid subsidies. The firm indeed might have different projects 
effecting profitability, therefore it might be misleading to derive the success of the project from 
the company’s overall performance. 
Moral hazard of state-aid can be reformulated as firms are accepting subsidies by knowing 
that the new development project will not have the optimum size, it might be bigger or smal-
ler, but the increase in net revenues or profit lags behind compared to the original project wit-
hout any restriction of documentary requirements. Any restriction might alter the development 
project’s success, therefore, to understand the planned hidden action of the firm regulators sho-
uld understand what would have been the real project size without state-aid grant, or in other 
worlds, what is the firms understanding of optimum project size.
In the following we turn to the different elements of the state-aid tendering and final cont-
racting documentation requirements. The grants can be defined in four different ways regarding 
backwards the effective date: (1) the year of the grant was transferred, or (2) all contracts have 
been mutually signed, or (3) the positive decision was communicated by the authorities, or (4) 
the tender documentation has been submitted. There might be several differences in the effec-
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2019/4222
tive calendar year of the grants, which makes more difficult statistically to capture the business 












Considering the sets of data to be submitted in the tendering process until the contracting 
phase we can understand all details the information basis, on which the development project is 
accepted, subsidized and monitored. 
•	 Admission	of	the	project	
All quantitative project details are presented, including a long-term business plan and an 
impact analysis. All financing needs and sources such as commercial bank loans, other subsidy 
grants and different business partners’ contributions. All documents required for submission 
have to in original format and have to be signed by the company. The tendering process starts 
with introducing the company and the planned development project. Concentrating on the im-
pact of the planned project the firm has to prove its capability of proper execution and financial 
support. Beside that a long-term business modelling has to be submitted as well, consisting all 
relevant information in a pre-defined format. 
•	 Proof	of	legitimacy	and	completeness	check	
Any project has to undergo a legitimacy check, which is by definition a quantitative appro-
ach. If any shortage prevails then there is one single opportunity to deliver the missing docu-
ments, unless the submission for subsidy will be rejected.
•	 	Content	assessment,	evaluation	and	approval	
Evaluation is performed by independent personnel on anonym documentation, which should 
ensure a neutral approach to all tenders. Formal elements are checked for validity and by conside-
ring long term business plan this time the viability and reasonability is analyzed for approval.
•	 Signing	the	contract	of	subsidy
After the decision for subsidy has been made the contracts will be signed by both parties, or so-
5 Take the example: submitted in late 2014, decision made in 2015, contracted in early 2016, and financially 
settled only in 2017. This comprises 4 calendar years, making it highly difficult to assign the positive effect 
of business development to a specific year.
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metimes even by several parties involved. The contract contains all details regarding execution of the 
development projects and also all penalties associated with non-performance or partial fulfillment.
•	 Financial	settlement	after	executing	the	project
State aid subsidy grants in Hungary for micro, small- and medium size enterprises are post 
financed after execution, if the projects’ indicators are successfully and in detail presented and are 
complete and fully in line with the development policy requirements. This measure is merely a 
snapshot providing no further incentives for company to perform orderly in the standstill period.
•	 Monitoring	phase
The standstill period of the projects the companies shall submit to inspections. The state aid subsi-
dy grants shall be only repaid fully or partially if inspectors will ascertain any irregularity. Considering 
the eligible costs, the industry and regional restrictions it has to be shown the fitting of the project to 
certain economic development goals6, detailing start, financial settlement and end date, standstill ob-
ligation period and other limitations. All of these criteria are neutral from moral hazard point of view, 
except eligible expenses, but this is still a restriction and not an incentive to alter future actions. Social 
consultation and dialog might have more positive impact on development projects than the disquali-
fication of certain form of expenses. Those are for example the rental expenses and the infrastructural 
investments of research, development and innovation, or licenses and know-how rights, or general 
management costs. The aim of monitoring remains simply to prevent any fraudulent activity.
4 Conclusions 
The most relevant and binding document of the state aid subsidies is the contract.  Substantive 
parts of the documentary requirements consisting both qualitative and quantitative information 
might have impact on moral hazard issues. As we concluded earlier that shortage of qualitative 
criteria limit the useable tools of control, and leave merely a formality check of quantitative data, 
which might help detect fraudulent behavior, but is insufficient to tackle moral hazard issues. Clo-
sely monitoring all the project could guarantee more success but considering the huge number of 
projects and consequently companies effected, it is not feasible. The next table shows number of 
projects in question. The 7-year planning period between 2007 and 2013, followed two more years 
of project admission, approval and financial settlement resulted in approx. forty thousand cases. 
Table 2: Number of Development Project 
 
Source: MNB, Ministry of Finance, own collection
6 As an example, we quote the Digital Welfare program setting new standards for IT infrastructure related projects
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If it would be more securities required in advance it would decrease the number of compani-
es eligible, which is actually against the basic logic of the state aid subsidies. It is intended to sub-
sidies SME’s in order to loosen credit constraint by making available cheap financing sources for 
those companies, which one would have not been able to apply for commercial bank loan. Bank 
collaterals are risk management tools and are not aimed to secure profitability of the company. It 
is designed to incentives the company management and owners not to lower their performance 
level during project execution and operation, and not to seek for private benefit. 
During the approval phase a formal check of the election criteria is done to ensure that all the 
submitted documents are valid and suitable. The substantive parts concentrate on the economic 
rationality and the expected impact on social surplus, all of these are ex-ante commitments, 
which should be closely controlled later. During monitoring and ex-post evaluation, however, 
there is only possible to analyze the company’s performance.
It is still a question what type of documentary requirements could be added, when the commu-
nicated goal of the operational programs for micro, small- and medium size enterprises is strengthe-
ning the market presence of those companies. It can be achieved through increase in turnover and 
profit level, which will contribute to increase in accumulated profits and finally share equity. First, 
it should be differentiated between successful closing the development project and more profitable 
operation of the company itself, since the project might generate positive revenue, whereas the en-
tire company might perform better or worse. From economic development policy point of view the 
company’s performance should be regarded, however during monitoring solely the project. There is 
need for a detailed business plan of the project alone, in which all company internal physical and fi-
nancial contribution should be accounted on the basis of the project. This could allow the Monitor-
ing Authority to have better oversight on the subsidized project, which would guarantee at the end 
of the day the more profitable company operation and the fulfilling of economic development goals.
We identified moral hazard as a hidden action of firms, by lowering effort level causing lesser 
probability of success, which is materialized in private benefit instead of increasing social surplus. 
It is straightforward that it is not possible influencing the behavior of companies in advance. There 
is a need for control the behavior of companies after they have received non-refundable state aid 
grants, however the documentary requirements con not be made responsible for doing this. We 
conclude furthermore that monitoring can be only made based on the requirements set in the 
original tender documentation and in the contract. As pointed out previously qualitative measu-
rers could be most welcome, however the logic and structure of the documentation requires rather 
quantitative indicators, since the fulfillment is unambiguous.  This could be similar to the ins-
urance industry incentives, where there is a proven record of success, that offering future financial 
benefits could have better controlling impact than closely monitoring the daily behavior.
If the Monitoring Authority were able to monitor closely the development projects than it 
could encounter moral hazard issues, which could be done on the basis of the documentary 
requirements of the tendering and contracting process. On the long run it would result in dec-
reasing number of companies accepting state aid subsidy grants, but in case of successful project 
execution it could be more positive impact on social surplus. If firms in the standstill period 
might expect an effective control process than they would concentrate on keeping the promise 
they made in the tendering phase and they would follow the goals of economic development po-
licy and the operational program, respectively. This would however, raise the operating expenses 
of the intermediary system, which also has to be considered.
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